Leading Innovation in Peace Operations: Strengthening Tomorrows' Performance

SUMMARY REPORT

1. The European Association of Peace Operations Training Centres (EAPTC) held its 6th Annual Seminar at the Maison de la Paix in Geneva 22-24 May 2018. Co-hosted by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), the Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF), the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), the Small Arms Survey, and supported by the Government of Switzerland, the 2018 EAPTC edition focused on *Leading Innovation in Peace Operations: Strengthening Tomorrows' Performance*.

2. The present report summarises the deliberations held and the key points made and reflects the views and ideas of the speakers and participants, and not necessarily those of the co-hosting organizations. Conducted under Chatham House Rules, the seminar discussion was non-attributable.

3. The opening session noted that the post-cold war era is coming to a closure, an era that triggered a massive expansion of international peacekeeping. In the backdrop of a forceful return to geopolitics, the use of force and power politics, many parts of the world are increasingly challenged by conflicts fuelled by organized crime, illicit networks, terrorism, natural resource diversion, environmental degradation, and corruption. Multidimensional peace operations by the United Nations or regional organizations are expected to confront a broad range of interrelated and mutually reinforcing challenges to peace, security, and development. Contemporary missions are mandated to address situations of utmost complexity, often in high-risk environments where there is very little if any peace to keep. Thus, with growing challenges in the field, but with less political cooperation and coordination on how to address them, and with decreasing financial resources to support operations, there is indeed an urgent and significant need to develop and adapt existing approaches. While concerted efforts have been made to adapt peace operations approaches and strategies to accommodate the changing security landscape, adaption is not keeping pace.

- **Multidimensional peace operations by the UN and regional organizations are expected to confront a broad range of interrelated and mutually reinforcing challenges to peace, security, and development;**

- **Recognition of the growing challenges in the field, but with less political cooperation and coordination on how to address them, and with decreasing financial resources to support operations, there is an urgent and significant need to develop and adapt existing approaches;**

- **The challenges facing peace operations are numerous and significant, but so too are the opportunities to make meaningful progress in Learning and Development terms.**

4. In these challenging times, the EAPTC 2018 set out to explore what the implications for tomorrows' preparation and training for peace operations are? What are the emerging needs and requirements? What concepts, methodologies, and capacities are needed? How can we strengthen peace operations and the women and men in the field doing their utmost for the people they have been sent to protect, support, and empower? A speaker at the seminar noted that the challenges facing peace operations are numerous and significant, but so too are the opportunities to make meaningful progress. The chosen topic for the EAPTC 2018, in addition to providing a fruitful stand-alone seminar in itself, also allowed a sustained effort looking explicitly at innovation, capacity building and strengthened performance of peace operations, as the theme would be revisited and further addressed during the IAPTC 2018 in New Zealand with its theme "Innovative Capacity Building for Effective Peace Operations". Indeed, the alignment of the IAPTC and EAPTC topics aimed at enabling joined up thinking and a maximum sharing of good practice amongst the global and regional peace operations communities.

5. The EAPTC 2018 Seminar brought together some 120 participants (an increase with more than 50 % from previous EAPTC editions) - civilians, military and police, of more than 30 nationalities. In addition to a strong European commitment and participation, such as the European External Action Service (EEAS), the European Security and Defence College (ESDC), the European Network of Civilian Capacities (ENTRi), and European peace operations and crisis management training centres, an effort was made to also invite key global partners, whether organizational (such as the United Nations, including the United Nations Institute for Training and Research), contributing countries (for example from Global South and Funding Countries), or think tanks (such as International Peace Institute, and the Peace Operations Training Institute).

6. The seminar covered a selection of topics related to *innovation* for better peace operations, areas where innovation play a central part and hold a promise for increased effectiveness and better outcomes of international interventions. Seeking to make optimal use of all women and men resources and to capatilise on new thinking across industries, the seminar was dedicated to exploring forward looking solutions fitting to meet the challenges of tomorrow. Informed by key strategic developments at the UN, regional organizations and in the field; six panels with 20 leading experts as well as break out groups working on scenario-based leadership learning development, produced a highly productive and knowledge infused and generating seminar. A critical component was the engaged and intensive dialogue that took place, which at one session literally became a "positive battle of the microphones". The dedicated Gender and Youth Champions respectively ensured a forward leaning and integrated approach to the issues.

- **Seeking to make optimal use of all women and men resources available and to capatilise on new thinking across industries, the seminar focused on a selection of topics related to *innovation* for better peace operations, areas where innovation play a central part and hold a particular promise for increased effectiveness and better outcomes of international interventions.**

- **The overall objective of the EAPTC 2018 Seminar was to:**
    1) **identify approaches, new methodologies and concepts, encouraging conversation and the sharing of information on how to better tackle the increasing complexity, risks and challenges facing peace operations;**
    2) **facilitate open and interactive engagement and learning to enable the effective application of peace operations training in improving the impact of new policy and practice in peace operations;**
    3) **improve the scope, diversity and relevance of the EAPTC relationships and networks; and**
    4) **complement, support, and enhance concurrent and innovative peace operational development work with partners and the IAPTC.**

7. Under the overarching theme of Leading Innovation in Peace Operations: Strengthening Tomorrows Performance, the sub-themes addressed were: 1) Challenging Times and Mission Complexity - Implications for Tomorrows Preparation and Training; 2) Mission Leadership Training – Gaps and Requirements; 3) Leadership Training Methodology - Leveraging Polarity Thinking for Future Peace Operations; 4) Responsive Governance and SSR: Building Sustainable Results; 5) Managing Information in Challenging Environments; 6) The Risks of Small Arms and Ammunition Loss;. A specific focus was given to the further sensitization and implementation of the Strategic Guidance Framework for International Police Peacekeeping.

8. Concluding the opening session, participants were challenged to reflect on some key questions. Despite much progress in recent years related to innovation, concepts and doctrine development and better training - in the field, there is still in most missions, a shortage of effective implementation, a lack of collegiality and insufficient coordination. It does not matter how much research and policies are developed, if things are not changing on the ground.

- **It was time to move from "What Now?" and "So What?" - to "Now What?!!"**

Challenging Times and Mission Complexity – Implications for Tomorrows Preparation and Training

9. The first core session explored what the emerging needs and requirements for peace operations are – concepts, methodologies and capacities. Recognizing that when things get complex, it gets challenging and we lose clarity. Challenges were identified in several dimensions and levels. A primary challenge is the increasingly hostile environment in which peacekeepers were operating – where non-state as well as local actors perceive peacekeepers negatively and as a legitimate target for attack. There are challenges at different levels: 1) strategic level – where the authorizing / mandating bodies such as the UN Security Council fail to effectively articulate what needs to be done, and how to interpret these needs in a political environment within the context of operational activity; 2) operational level – where the heads of mission, senior leadership and mission leadership teams are often struggling to lead the missions; and 3) tactical level – where the overall delivery of what needs to be done is not happening. Leading innovation for more effective peace operations require all three levels to be extensively involved and substantially

improved and developed. It was suggested that innovation not least in the form of new technology is important, but the development and right selection of leaders, those that are to drive the process, the mission, and who can move between the strategic, operational and tactical levels, is the true linchpin to making real progress on the ground.

10. The session continued assessing what needs to be done at the strategic level. Innovation for peace operations is not about gadgets, but about changing organizational culture and behavior, including how to best minimize risk aversion. A key challenge is how can an organizational culture that embraces innovation best be cultivated? The UN has recently launched and piloted a number of reform processes including management, the development agenda, and the peace and security architecture, including the Action for Peacekeeping agenda. But resistance to reform and changes has been significant amongst UN Member States, but also within the UN, its agencies, funds and programs. Hence, the UN Secretary General turned the Organizations attention to focus on innovation – how to enable and empower leaders at all levels to push for a continuous improvement and innovation. Four areas are in focus: 1) Planning and working towards integration; 2) Learning how to operate in complex environments; 3) Learning how to better manage performance; 4) Learning how to better engage with new technology and shift organizational culture. Specifically, the scaled up use of raw data and state of the art analytics tools has been highlighted as useful and a focus area of innovation for peace operations.

- **Innovation for peace operations is primarily not about gadgets, but about changing organizational culture and behavior.**

- **Recent major UN reform (management, development, peace and security, including peacekeeping) has met some resistance both at Member States and UN system level; thus a key focus of the UN Secretary-General 2018 agenda is to promote and embrace a culture of innovation, to shape and encourage leaders for innovation at all levels.**

- **Focus areas:**
    1) **Planning and working towards integration;**
    2) **Learning how to operate in complex environments;**
    3) **Learning how to better manage performance;**
    4) **Learning how to better engage with new technology and shift organizational culture.**

11. Reflecting on the current volatile and complex operational environments in the field, two perspectives focused on the experiences and requirements of the OSCE Mission in Ukraine and the UN Mission in the Central African Republic respectively. The deteriorating security situation in Ukraine had forced the OSCE to re-examine the strategy and implementation needed to meet the mandate. Over 4000 cease-fire violations had been recorded. The OSCE Mission has made particular headway in its focus on technological innovations and solutions for strengthening its mission results. These include for example, the deployment and utility of unmanned vehicles with long range capabilities and a ring of cameras which allowed seeing into otherwise inaccessible areas, the extensive use of

satellite images, acoustic sensors which allows pinpoint of where departing fire is coming from.

12. The new challenge is not how to access information, but how to manage the shear amount of imagery and information available and collected. How can the massive amount of data generated be best analyzed? How can it be made sense of and made useful for the mission and in support of the mission objective? There is a great need for training of personnel, including from a gender perspective, on how to analyze and operationalize the information generated.

- **The new challenge is not how to access information, but how to manage the shear amount of imagery and information available and collected. How can it be made sense of and most useful for mandate delivery?**

- **There is great need for training of personnel, including from a gender perspective, on how to analyze and operationalize the information generated.**

13. The perspective from MINUSCA was focused on leadership and what is necessary for effective decision making under high-operational stress. In an environment of high expectations on the peacekeepers - quick solutions and with impatient local populations and funders alike, a key challenge to the mission achieving its objective, is the detrimental impact of spoilers on the peace process. The discussion focused on 1) Intuition vs Intelligence. The focus should be on perceptions, not necessarily the reality. "Things do not move because of realities, but rather because of perceptions of the reality". There needs to be a balance between intuition vs intelligence. Human problems require human solutions, technologies are only enablers.

14. How to "train" the managing and handling of perception as the reality should be a priority. Intelligence and the development of an intelligence culture is critical, not least for developing the ability to understand the root causes of the conflict. The development of the UN Intelligence Framework is central in this regard and work on operationalizing it in the field is ongoing and needs to be implemented across all missions. Intelligence is required to be able to ask the right questions. Building on the central component of perceptions, the role of strategic communications was explored.

15. Strategic communication, or rather the lack of it, has been identified as a major missed opportunity in the ability of the mission to understand the people, culture, and complexities. Effectively done, strategic communication can help the local population understand the purpose and role of the mission, its limitations and possibilities, and diminish the power of the spoilers on the peace process. Indeed, strategic communication becomes an important risk management tool. Innovative approaches are required to win the battle of the narrative, to be able to shape the landscape of communication and understanding. Leaders need to be seen and heard, the mandate should be clear, and the mission needs to adapt its approaches to reach out to the communities better.

16. Overall, there was consensus in that leadership and innovation is critical and well recognized factors contributing to the success (or failure) of a mission. Leadership is "everywhere" - yet, we are still continuing to come short in how we train and prepare

leaders for the job. Across the panelists and the interactive conversation with the participants, the following characteristics were high-lighted as key to strong leadership:

  a. well informed, effective decision-making;
  b. a proactive culture of planning;
  c. an openness to innovation;
  d. availability of intelligence;
  e. understanding of the root causes of conflict;
  f. developed emotional intelligence; and
  g. effective strategic communication.

17. The risk of keeping reinventing the wheel and not making positive innovations stick was raised by one of the panelists. Proposed as one of the most innovative missions to date, a joint UN and Organization of the American States human rights mission in Haiti in the 1990s, had made all new staff arrivals undergo a mandatory 3-6 weeks training on the local language, history and culture of Haiti. The ability of the mission to subsequently engage with the local community much more easily and gain a better understanding of the culture in which it operated facilitated the work and impact of the mission considerably. This is unfortunately not done today. An innovation was lost.


- **There needs to be a balance between intuition vs intelligence. Human problems require human solutions, technologies are only enablers. Focus should be on understanding and shaping perceptions, not necessarily the reality. "Things do not move because of realities, but rather because of perceptions of the reality"**

- **Intelligence and the development of an intelligence culture is critical, not least for developing the ability to understand the root causes of the conflict.**

- **Strategic communication, or rather the lack of it, has been identified as a major missed opportunity in the ability of the mission to understand the people, culture, and complexities. Effectively done, strategic communication can help the local population understand the purpose and role of the mission, its limitations and possibilities, and diminish the power of the spoilers on the peace process.**

Leading Innovation in Peace Operations: Mission Leadership Training – Gaps and Requirements

18. The High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) stated that leadership is "one of the most crucial factors in the success or failure of UN peace operations." Further, the report on *Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers* (the so called Cruz Report) identified a deficit in leadership as one of the primary components preventing adaptation within the United Nations System. This assessment was generally shared by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services which found that despite positive and concerted attempts at capacity building, current leadership continues to feel underprepared in the field. Thus strengthening leadership for peace operations is critical. The seminar explored the gaps and requirements for senior leadership preparation and training in terms of concepts, methodologies, and pedagogy.

19. Leadership sets the intent, the tone, and the ethic of a mission. It is the lever that results in the commitment of individuals, teams, and organizations to align resources, energy, and actions toward shared, meaningful outcomes. The seminar explored what are the gaps and requirements in mission leadership training? What emerging methodologies can strengthen the preparation of future leaders? What types of methodologies for adult learning are most applicable for leading peace operations? How can scenario-based leadership training strengthen mission leadership and what should it look like and contain? What methodologies are most appropriate to ensure gender sensitive training goals are effectively met? Case studies informed three working groups with the objective to contribute to the development of new scenario based training for mission leaders. The areas addressed by the working groups included: 1) Protection of Civilians; 2) Managing Relations with Parallel Forces; and 3) Safety and Security Crises (see further below).

20. One panelist underscored that the Cruz Report was not an isolated report. It was in line with several recent previous reports. Its specificity and power lie in its highlighting of a series of tactical weaknesses, having major strategic negative impact, while pointing to the failure of leadership at all levels as a major cause for the weaknesses identified. The seminar session thus turned its focus on what was required for the UN (and other organizations deploying peacekeepers) to do a better job at preparing leaders for operations, and it was emphasized it takes "a lot more than running leaders through a course". Focusing on the UN, a number of challenges were identified. First, Heads of missions come from outside of the UN. They often derive from another organizational culture to which they are familiar with. They are hired because they have the appropriate profile, represents strong regional or external players/countries, or they are politically acceptable to the Security Council or the host nation. None of these reasons are linked to management and leadership. Second, uniformed personnel – Forced Commanders and Police Commissioners will have served before in a UN mission, or been interviewed through some process. They have normally some good understanding of the professional environment but lack a deep understanding of the UN. They are likely to have had leadership training and management training, and by virtue of their rank, they should be reasonably successful in exercising their responsibilities. Third, other members of the UN Senior leadership team (mission chief of staff, chief of support, director of mission support) – i.e. the UN Insiders are normally sensitized to the UN ways, rules and procedures, are selected for their leadership and management skills as well as professional expertise. In short, they normally have both.

21. Regarding the overall context, the mission leaders will meet for the first time in the mission, seeking to run a team and run a police and military operation. Essentially, it was like "running a small country, in a hostile environment with limited support, and a complicated mandate". The challenges are tremendous. What innovations are required to strengthen the support of the preparation of the mission leadership? It was suggested that a life-cycle approach to senior leadership preparation needs to be adopted and range from a tailored in briefing process to post-deployment mentoring and training.

22. Developing a culture, which sees exercises and rehearsals as part of the normal professional process, is essential. This is easier for uniformed personnel than for civilians, but it needs to be built in. Scenario-based leadership training can contribute to the development of more effective strategic thinking, decision making and crisis management.

It was proposed that the use of real-world examples in a controlled environment is most effective. There is no silver bullet for senior leadership and management training "when things go wrong, the answer from senior leadership is more training, however, training is not the only answer to performance issues. Sometimes it is a better selection, better equipment, better moral, or better planning."

- **Leadership sets the intent, the tone, and the ethic of a mission. It is the lever that results in the commitment of individuals, teams, and organizations to align resources, energy, and actions toward shared, meaningful outcomes**.

- **Leading a mission in 2018 is much like "running a small country, in a hostile environment with limited support, and a complicated mandate".**

- **Innovative approaches required to strengthen the support of the preparation of the mission leadership include adopting a life-cycle approach to senior leadership preparation ranging from a tailored in briefing process to post-deployment mentoring and training.**

- **Developing a culture, which sees exercises and rehearsals as part of the normal professional process, is essential.**

- **Scenario-based leadership training using real world examples in a controlled environment can contribute to the development of more effective strategic thinking, decision-making and crisis management.**

23. Findings from a workshop on "The making of leaders for 21st-century peace operations" hosted by the Centre on International Peace Operations was presented and discussed. The focus was on how to become a good leader, which was essentially two-fold: 1) Inform people on what needs to be done, and 2) Do it right away.

24. A holistic approach to learning is required, i.e. one learns with hearts and guts with the aim to make informed decision-making based on intuition. Critical to success is also the focus on leadership as a team effort. One needs to accept that leadership has something to do with the team. Key outcomes of the workshop included the focus on 1) Informed intuition – which should not just focus recruitment on skills, but rather the readiness to increase ones skills and embrace the learning aspect (a growth mindset); 2) Teamwork- empowering a team, coaching, and facilitating deliberations within a team; 3) Comprehensive training - for senior mission leaders and middle mission management; 4) Performance evaluation to include the aspect of learning - what is sought to be achieved in terms of learning should be criteria for evaluating one's performance. Commenting on the learning model 70-20-10, it was discussed that learning happens 10% in terms of formal transfer of knowledge and skills, 20% by receiving a manual, inputs or tips from professions, while 70% of learning comes informally, through experiences. It was stressed that key to effective learning is to make the 10% of formal transfer of knowledge and skills, strong enough to inform the remaining 70%.

25. The session continued to reflect on the dimensions of informal learning or learning through experience. It was noted that leaders are facing difficult environments with many new tasks

requiring innovation and change. Fundamentally, the required growth mindset calls for challenges to be seen as opportunities for growth, feedback as constructive, and working with others to fill in the gaps and get support. Tailored forms of training are particularly relevant. Training and learning should not end with the training, but should continue throughout the entire experience, from more in-mission training, after action reviews, and end of assignment reports. There is less focus on in-mission, team-based training, a gap which needs to be filled. Leadership and management as training audiences are often treated separately, and management is often not included. It was proposed that scenario-based training can help to fill these gaps.

26. It was stressed that leadership is about influence, not a position of authority. Developing and identifying the competencies required is complex and should be done in a collaborative environment. Everything is linked to recruitment. When recruiting, profiles should be sought, not skills; qualities and capabilities should be tested; a continuous learning competency should be incorporated. Innovation in recruitment that held promise included personality testing, psychometric profiling and situational judgment questioning. Concluding the session, it was suggested that learning from other mindset is the key point for leadership, as is the ability to empower ones team. Such leadership requires vision, direction, empathy, inclusivity and humility. Respect is a key factor in the exercise of strong leadership. If respect of subordinate staff is weak, this will be reinforcing, hampering missions at the operational level as well. The polarities of control and empowerment, are not exclusive, it is about leveraging the different polarities and finding an optimal balance (see further below the session on leveraging polarities).

27. Contributing to the development of scenario-based learning training for mission leadership, the seminar participants broke into three working groups and developed content for input to the International Peace Institute led project on UN, regional and national training modules for mission leadership. The working groups focused on the following three areas:

    a. Protection of Civilians (POC) and how POC crises are best dealt with, including where government forces are threatening civilians and where intercommunity violence is occurring. The group explored how issues of internal coordination within the mission, between mission headquarters and sub-offices, and division of labour between civilian, military, and police to address POC crises, are best led and managed. The participants considered how POC threats should be prioritized most effectively.

    b. Managing Relations with Parallel Forces was explored through responding to the questions of how relations with parallel forces could best be managed in mission areas. When parallel forces with different mandates -which could include offensive or counterterrorism roles -operate alongside a United Nations mission, how and how much do the missions need to be coordinated? How are POC mandates and offensive operations in the same theatres reconcilable? What if the UN mission is asked to support these operations? What risk management is needed? What are the legal issues that arise?

    c. Safety and Security Crises was the focus of the third group. How are safety and security crises best managed and led in missions? When a complex attack against a sub-office take place, with casualties reported, what are the issues, dilemmas, and considerations to be acted upon and how? The group sought to respond to

how lessons can be learned and more effective strategies implemented to lead in crisis. The results of the three working groups were fed into the continued development of the project and its expected finalisation later in the year, at which time the training modules will be broadly available.

- **A holistic approach to learning is required, i.e. one learns with hearts and guts with the aim to make informed decision-making based on intuition.**

- **Leaders are facing difficult environments with many new tasks requiring innovation and change. The necessary growth mindset allows for challenges to be seen as opportunities for growth, feedback as constructive, and working with others to fill in the gaps and get support.**

- **Training and learning should not end with the pre-deployment training, but continue throughout the entire experience, including more in-mission training, after action reviews, and end of assignment reports.**

- **Leadership and management as training audiences are often treated separately, and management is often not included.**

- **Leadership requires vision, direction, empathy, inclusivity and humility.**

Leading Innovation in Peace Operations: Leadership Training Methodology – Leveraging Polarity Thinking for Future Peace Operations

28. The stakes of leading peace operations are high. The context is charged with polarizing views and forces. Diverse local, national and international actors are forced together under the most challenging and complex of circumstances. Generals, warlords, peace activists, clergy, donors, diplomats, NGOs, monitors, community leaders, bureaucrats, etc., somehow must collectively lead to peace. Leading effectively is crucial. Yet there are few missions that can claim successes in meeting what is often considered impossible mission mandates.

29. Leadership development often focuses on characteristics, styles and practices of individuals and teams. In other words, who and how one leads. This is also true in peacekeeping training. There is a need to complement a leader-centred' developmental approach with a focus on leading in the presence of 'polarising tensions.' Or on a specific context of 'what' is being led. *Leading in polarised tensions* is not only about problem solving. It is increasingly about leading *tensions that recur and have no solution, per se*. In fact, taking a *problem solving* approach, or mindset, to polarized tensions can rather perpetuate a cycle of undesirable outcomes caused by the oscillation between the negative outcomes of over-focusing on one side of a tension at a given time. Imposing a 'wicked-problem-solving' mindset onto situations filled with non-solvable problems is called into question. There is a difference between leading change and leading tensions or polarities. Change is a process. Change has a defined beginning (current state) and an end (future state). Much like a problem has.

30. At a UN peace operations mandate level, this view is precisely relevant. The aim is to move from conflict instability to post-conflict stability. The challenge faced, however, is that post-conflict stability can be characterized as an ongoing equilibrium of tensions rather than a 'resolution of a core set of wicked problems'. Efficient administration AND representative governance; justice AND peace; adopting international norms AND preserving local customs; achieving shorter term security imperatives (disarmament) AND advancing longer term security reform; advancing host country interests AND integrating into regional institutions/economy; etc. All of these *tensions are never really solved.* They are rather advanced in an effective equilibrium. Isn't the challenge of civilization to leverage these tensions to the benefit of as many as possible for as long as possible? Leveraging, for example, the tension between justice & retribution AND long-standing peace & security after violent conflict, can take decades and generations of carefully navigating tensions and wounds. Emphasizing justice & retribution to the neglect of establishing long-term joint and inclusive production of peace & security, history shows in the long-term, keeps a cycle of violence in motion.

31. Based on a project focused on Leveraging polarities for more effective peace operations led by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and the Centre for Creative Leadership, the seminar participants discussed and explored the process for addressing polarities: 1) one must see them; 2) map them; 3) assess/monitor them which leverage them for a higher purpose. The process extends stakeholder mapping into a dynamic enterprise that persists as long as there exists shared higher purpose (like peace for example). The two case studies used during the seminar focused on 1) the polarities of the pursuit of peace AND justice by the UN mission in the DRC, and 2) UN policing and the polarities at play in relation to the executive AND advisory responsibilities. Leadership development in peace operations requires a better means of addressing tensions that goes beyond stakeholder interest mapping. Leveraging polarities is the next step in leadership development. It complements so much, puts stakeholder mapping in a dynamic context and helps one revisit the nature of 'wicked problems' in a useful manner that is trainable and engaging of stakeholders themselves.

- **There is a need to complement a leader-centred' developmental approach with a focus on leading in the presence of 'polarising tensions.' Or on a specific context of 'what' is being led. *Leading in polarised tensions* is not only about problem solving. It is increasingly about leading *tensions that recur and have no solution, per se*.**

- **There is a difference between leading change (which has a defined beginning - current state- and an end -future state) and leading tensions or polarities.**

- **Leadership development in peace operations requires a better means of addressing tensions that goes beyond stakeholder interest mapping.**
- **Leveraging polarities is the next step in leadership development.**

Leading Innovation in Peace Operations: Security Sector Reform–Responsive Governance in Building Sustainable Results

32. The seminar deliberations turned to the issues of what challenges need to be addressed and what innovative solutions can be found to strengthen the effectiveness and impact of security and justice sector reform. What implications and opportunities lie in the new European Union SSR policy and training strategy? How can a holistic yet operationally relevant strategic approach to the practical application of an integrated SSR policy, operational practice, and education best be developed and implemented? What is the experience and lessons learned from a UN perspective? What are the common denominators and how can the respective experiences enrich the development of complementary approaches?

33. Overall the growth and demand for SSR components in international crisis management and peace operations, is significant. Mandates have exponentially grown and they have diversified. Given this increased diversification and complexity, there has been an increased realization of the need to innovate new peacekeepers profiles that can better meet the specialized requirements of missions and the ground. For example, in UN policing, specialised policing teams are to be made up of fully functional teams on protection of civilians, crime policing etc. There are also efforts made to cultivate youth police, to create a professional cultural that rewards international policing, so that younger colleagues can seek to develop their competences (such as language) before having the required years of service before they can apply to international missions (7 years).

34. Overall the session identified six areas of particular importance for generating sustainable results in the strengthening of governance through SSR and related processes. They were 1) establishment of holistic reforms and coordination; 2) adoption of clear frameworks (doctrine, guidance and strategies); 3) recognizing and working with the political natures of reform; 4) prioritize realistic planning and budgets; 5) ensure effective integration of women in peace operations frameworks; and 6) strengthen knowledge about and utilisation of tools that have been innovated and developed.

35. One of the critical gaps identified in SSR mandates for crisis management and peace operations is effective coordination - the inability to take into consideration the linkages with other stakeholders in the field. Leadership needs to adopt a broad and comprehensive outlook on engagement to have successful and innovative mission implementation. Examples of holistic reforms and coordination mechanisms included
    a. the EU Mission in Ukraine consisting of an integrated approach, taking into account the various international organisations deployed as well as the civilian, police and military components and perspectives;
    b. the UN Global Focal Point bringing together various institutions and competencies to work across the criminal justice chain; and
    c. through gender mainstreaming which connects often unrelated actors and institutions to develop holistic and comprehensive gender sensitive SSR perspectives and strategies.

36. Clear frameworks are essential for successful reforms and effective missions and operations. For holistic reforms to occur and take into account the broader context – clear frameworks, principles and procedures need to be in place. These will guide staff, establish clear objectives and strengthen cohesion. Specific focus was put on

a. the Strategic Guidance for International Police Peacekeeping (SGF);
b. the EU Common Security and Defence Policy Training Policy; and
c. the EU SSR Framework. No reform or capacity building process would be successful without a proper governance and accountability framework. Progress is lost if there is no governance and accountability framework within which and against which to anchor the progress and programmes.

37. The Strategic Guidance for International Police Peacekeeping (SGF) was developed in consultation with 193 UN Member States and consists of four building blocks: Command, Operations, Capacity-building, and Police Administration. It is a primary framework informing police peacekeeping of not only the UN, but also the regional, sub-regional and national organisations and police forces. It is also a mechanism for accountability- as it sets the standards for which all UN police will need to operate. The development and now roll out of the SGF is an example of what is making a significant and lasting impact on the way in which peace operations is planned, conducted and evaluated against. It is in this sense a true innovation, different from an invention, which may not have a lasting impact. The work on developing the training curricula for the SGF will be elaborated upon and addressed at the IAPTC 2018 in Auckland.

- **A holistic yet operationally relevant strategic approach to the practical application of an integrated SSR policy, operational practice, and education is key for mission success**

- **Six areas of particular importance to delivering sustainable results:**
  1. **establishment of holistic reforms and coordination;**
  2. **adoption of clear frameworks (doctrine, guidance and strategies);**
  3. **recognizing and working with the political natures of reform;**
  4. **prioritize realistic planning and budgets;**
  5. **ensure effective integration of women in peace operations frameworks;**
  6. **strengthen knowledge about and utilisation of tools that have been innovated and developed.**

- **The Strategic Guidance for International Police Peacekeeping (SGF) is informing police peacekeeping of not only the UN, but also the regional, sub-regional and national organisations and police forces. A mechanism also for accountability- it sets the standards for which all UN police will need to operate. The development and roll out of the SGF is making a significant impact on the way in which peace operations is planned, conducted and evaluated.**

- **There is a need to cultivate youth police, to create a professional cultural that rewards international policing, so younger colleagues can develop their competences (for ex. language) before having the required years of service for international missions.**

38. Leadership is about establishing a clear and coherent framework to improve coordination. In doing so, it will allow for more clear objectives and coordinated approaches. The EU has established a variety of tools that help reinforce the single SSR Framework that has been put in place. The EU wide SSR support framework is integrated and acknowledges the

interlinkages between politics, security, justice and humanitarian response and development. It takes into account short and long term engagement so as to improve realistic planning. It aligns with the broader UN Charter and international law. Examples include monitoring and evaluation guidelines, and the EU Iraq mission perceived success through its rapid deployment and training. It was on the ground in 4 months.

39. Additionally, tools of the EU include the Center on Conflict Prevention, the EU Security Sector Governance Facility, which aims to provide short term expertise for CSDP missions, and the new CSDP Training Policy.

40. The importance of recognizing the political nature of reform was essential. Leaders need to understand the political environments in which they operate. Political engagement is more successful through systematic and sustained dialogue, which requires a mature understanding by leaders how the political nature of the work in a specific context works. Taking the example of police reform, it is immensely political and takes years to reform even within a developed nation. It was proposed by one of the panellist that the estimated success rate of police reform takes 41 years.

41. Another key to successful and innovative leadership is the need to be realistic when setting objectives and establishing budgets. Too often, the SSR community creates unrealistic expectations, when it is clear that reform is a long-term process. Budgeting correctly, planning accurately and incorporating an M&E framework has shown to be central to mission success.

42. Integrating women in peace operations framework will accelerate the ability to achieve the mandate. The role of women is improving with new standards being put in place. For example, there is now training at command level, such as a UN Senior Female Police Officer Command Course. By making clear to countries who wish to have successful candidates for police positions, by proposing women candidates as well, increases their chances of acceptance. A focus on gender also serves to build partnerships with a broader range of stakeholders, allowing for a more comprehensive process. The seminar also discussed the need to ensure that the knowledge and tools developed are broadly known and made to use. A number of innovative tools can help guide reform processes, such as for example the Police Master Class and the DCAF Gender Tool Kit.

43. Critical factors for programmatic success were suggested to be 1) recognition of importance of trained, qualified personnel; 2) the ability to draw on experiences of innovative solutions in the field; 3) the identification of skills sets and what circumstances create an environment for innovation to come about. Further recommendations made during the session included 1) Building skills in prioritization, sequencing, coordination and risk management; 2) Establishing and effective monitoring and evaluation framework that tracks outcomes not just outputs; 3) Leadership needs to understand how the pieces fit together; 4) Gender analysis- progress has been made but need to accelerate; 5) bottom up approaches should gain more traction; 6) increase commitment to lessons learning; 7) increasing the flow of knowledge between knowledge cells , advisory field work and the development tools; and 8) need to increase training on strategic advising skills.

- **The EU has established a variety of tools that help reinforce the single SSR**

Framework that has been put in place. The EU wide SSR support framework is integrated and acknowledges the interlinkages between politics, security, justice and humanitarian response and development. It takes into account short and long term engagement so as to improve realistic planning. It aligns with the broader UN Charter and international law. Examples include monitoring and evaluation guidelines, and the EU Iraq mission perceived success through its rapid deployment and training.

- **Key factors for programmatic success include:**
  1) Recognition of the importance of trained, qualified personnel;
  2) Ability to draw on experiences of innovative solutions in the field;
  3) Identification of skills sets and what circumstances create an environment for innovation to come about.

Leading Innovation in Peace Operations: Managing Information in Challenging Environments

44. How can the promises, concepts, and tools of new technology be best put to use for enabling and empowering peace operation mandates and missions? What are the requirements in the field? What challenges need to be overcome and what are some of the latest innovations that can or are already making a concrete difference on the ground? How can peace operations and peacebuilding draw on the experiences of the humanitarian and development fields by taking full advantage of, for example, geo-enabled technologies?

45. This session explored knowledge and information and the manners in which different tools can use innovation to fill gaps, and potentially create new and stronger linkages. Some of the challenges that were first outlined include: 1) Rotational cycles and short-term deployments. This creates the question of where to store information, and how to do so in a manner in which it is handed over, and the overall institution has learned; 2) Too much data- how can we organize our information to best serve the immediate and long-term needs of the institution and mission mandate?; 3) How can data best be transmitted- with various documents moving around, how can it be done in a fashion that is organized, safe, and security?; 4) Culture: cultivating the organizational and individual culture in which tools and technology are relied upon is an additional challenge, as Senior Leaders often resist.

46. Different institutions have adapted to the challenges confronting their mandates in various ways. Examples that were discussed included: 1) ENTRi has developed tools to help with the handing over of information and trying to retain and strengthen institutional knowledge; 2) OSCE has utilized various tools to strengthen both the manner in which they collect information, as well as how it is disseminated to the appropriate departments; 3) GICHD use technologies like GIS to serve as a tool that not only provided data and information but can serve as a mechanism for accountability and coordination as well.

47. The panel suggested in different ways three overall observations. First, the importance of asking the right questions is critical. The starting point for any process is based on what you seek to collect as information, hence tools can only support a process, but it is the quality of personnel and leaders who know how to capitalize on these tools that is

fundamental to its success. Second, organizing and structuring information can better inform leaders, however, the value of information management needs to be recognized by leaders. There needs to be a strong understanding of what is needed, based on context, objectives, roles and responsibilities.

48. Programs are increasingly tailored. There need to be both platforms that are tailored for a specific use, as well as comprehensive platforms that enable easier sharing of information. One of the challenges lie in how best bring these two demands together. Third, sharing information and lessons learned- gathering information is often not very useful until it is analyzed (though raw data also serves a purpose as well). While there are a variety of tools to help analyze data, what is critical, particularly in regards to staff turnover and institutional memory - is that this analysis is available to new staff, properly organized (part of information management) and that lessons are identified and shared. We need to refine our approaches to disseminating information in manners that are secure and protect the integrity of the mission.

- **Challenges to effective information management include:**
  1) Rotational cycles and short-term deployments;
  2) Too much data - how can information be organized to best serve mission mandate?;
  3) How can data best be transmitted so that is organized, safe, and secure?;
  4) How can organizational and individual culture be encouraged to rely more on new and innovative tools and technology?

- **The ability to ask the right questions is critical - the quality of personnel and leaders who know how to capitalize on these tools is fundamental to its success.**

- **There need to be both platforms that are tailored for a specific use, as well as comprehensive platforms that enable easier sharing of information.**

- **While there are a variety of tools to help analyze data, it is critical that the analysis is available to new staff, properly organized and that lessons are identified and shared.**

Leading Innovation in Peace Operations: Addressing the Risk of Small Arms and Ammunition Loss

49. A final focus session took a closer look at the loss of arms and ammunition in peace operations and what could be done to improve the way in which this can be minimized if not fully prevented. The panelists and participants sought to address what the risks of small arms and ammunition loss in peace operations environments are and what can be done to minimise its occurrence? What are the risk factors and behaviours? What are the entry points for better practice? In what way do or can the use of force, the selection criteria for troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs), mission equipment needs, and pre-deployment training play? Ultimately, the conversation also explored what type of training is required for TCCs/PCCs as well as mission personnel?

50. Until recently, ammunition loss has not received the attention it should, however, if we hope to call for a holistic approach, greater consideration needs to be given towards filling the gaps in the areas of small arms and light weapons (SALW) management and small arms and ammunition loss. The UN has long recognized the issues surrounding SALW, safety, and security, and their link to performance and leadership. However, the Cruz report was influential in generating attention to this problem at the level of the UN Secretary-General.

51. There are major shortcomings in this area which include gaps in management, monitoring/recording SALW, which link to leadership. In relation to management – there are few guidelines/SoPs/ frameworks/ standards in place for address SALW. Coupled with growing complex mandates, this leaves officers often lost in regards to what needs to occur. There is still a lot of ambiguity and ad hoc reporting. There continues to be a lack of clarity in the roles and responsibilities, in regards to PoC and protection of arms, despite there being clear RoE.

52. Currently there is very little monitoring and recording done, particularly with regards to recovering weapons. While this is gradually changing, it is worth noting that understanding, monitoring and assessing SALW management can help identify root causes of SALW. This links to the previous conversations about the importance of intelligence as well as how to address the changing safety and security climate for peacekeepers. Effective monitoring and recording SALW can help to establish what is preventable and what was inevitable. This can also improve future planning, and help enhance the safety and security of uniformed personnel. The establishment of more standardized processes and procedures could better guide performance and serve as a tool for leaders. These can include: 1) Harmonization of procedures and standardization of management processes; and 2) Development of disciplinary and evaluation frameworks.

53. SALW is a performance and disciplinary issue and therefore linked to leadership. There is great importance in attaining realistic timelines for when implementation will occur. Further, there is a need to expand the understanding of what needs to be monitored. This should include: 1) Explosives; 2) Ammunition; and 3) Non-lethal equipment.

- **The UN has long recognized the issues surrounding SALW, safety, and security, and their link to performance and leadership. But the Cruz report was influential in generating attention to this problem at the level of the UN Secretary-General creating a real momentum for change.**

- **In relation to management – there are few guidelines/SoPs/ frameworks/ standards in place for address SALW.**

- **Effective monitoring and recording SALW can help to establish what is preventable and what was inevitable, and improve future planning, and help enhance the safety and security of uniformed personnel.**

- **The establishment of more standardized processes and procedures could better guide performance and serve as a tool for leaders. These can include:**

> **1) Harmonization of procedures and standardization of management processes; and**
> **2) Development of disciplinary and evaluation frameworks.**

Conclusion

54. The aim of the 6th Annual Seminar of the EAPTC was to share perspectives, encourage dialogue and debate, and to facilitate a collective discussion on what in training terms can be done practically to make the most of innovation and leadership development to improve the performance and professionalism of United Nations and regional organizations peace operations.

55. Through detailed and interactive discussions and working groups, the seminar participants explored the opportunities for innovations - mindsets, methods, concepts, tools and techniques that were proposed to enable informed and intuitive decision-making, strategic and realistic planning and budgeting. The seminar deliberations benefited from the sharing and discussion of a range of initiatives, projects, and piloting efforts in support of making peace operations and crisis management more effective, efficient and sustainable.

56. The work on identifying, developing and supporting innovative ways and approaches will continue, at the forthcoming Annual Conference of the International Association of Peace Operations Training Centres (IAPTC) 2018 in New Zealand 1-4 October, and the UN Workshop on the Strategic Guidance Framework for International Police Peacekeeping held just preceding the IAPTC meeting.

57. Further on, the 7th Annual Seminar of the European Association of Peace Operations Training Centres 2019 will be hosted 16-18 of April in Belgrade. The Host, the Conflux Center for Intercultural Dialogue and Mediation, has as its mission to promote international cooperation, intercultural dialogue and mediation as essential tools in addressing challenges and threats to world peace and security. The quest for improving civilian, police and military peace operations - UN and regional - continues!

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